COLAPSO DOS AYATOLAS E GUERRA DE 4ª GERAÇÃO NO ESTREITO DE ORMUZ

COLAPSO DOS AYATOLAS E GUERRA DE

4ª GERAÇÃO NO 'ESTREITO DE ORMUZ'

 

Até ao fim do ano... Em Abri 2009, os ayatolas comemoram o seu 30º aniversário da tomada do poder e querem apresentar ao mundo, nessa circunstância e com muita pompa, a sua realidade de potência nuclear! "Até ao fim do ano" é, portanto, a janela estratégica para destruir o programa nuclear militar dos "loucos de Alá". Mas se o colapso da "república islâmica" pode ser obtido através da exploração das vantagens que a "guerra assimétrica" (airpower-based EBO, effects based operation) oferece aos Estados Unidos e Israel, também é verdade que o regime dos ayatolas tem as suas vantagens "assimétricas", que a "guerra de 4ª geração" lhe oferece. E o estreito de Ormuz, por onde transita boa parte do petróleo que o Ocidente (mas não só...) consome, será atacado e bloqueado com atentados e ataques com pequenos botes e lanchas rápidas. Uma coisa parece certa, para todos os observadores, uma invasão terrestre, como a do Iraque, está excluída... O objectivo é a destruição das infra-estruturas tecnológicas e, por essa, via colapsar o regime dos ayatolas e isso não necessita grandes operações em terra, é obtido via EBO... John Robb explica a coisa:

IRAN AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

There is still a significant possibility of a US/Israeli air attack on Iran during the closing months of this year. A multitude of triggers could set it off. Here's some thinking you might find useful if it does occur.

Any attack by the US/Israel on Iran will be ostensibly aimed at suppressing the Iranian nuclear program. However, it will quickly evolve into something much larger, an airpower-based EBO (effects based operation). The objective of this EBO will regime change (see the brief: "Collapsing Iran", April 2006, for more details on this) without a ground invasion. It is assumed that by completely disrupting (turning off) the entire country's critical infrastructures (from power to communications to transportation) and isolating the country's leadership (in their bunkers), the country will quickly fragment in hundreds of competing factions.

NOTE: There is a line of reasoning (in various military circles)  that the only success the US has had militarily over the last two decades has been from the application of air power. From the two Gulf Wars to Afghanistan, airpower was successful. Ground forces were successful to the extent they mopped up afterwards and quickly withdrew. In contrast, it was only when the Army/Marines attempted to hold ground that the US military ran into trouble. These advocates maintain that the US military should never hold ground in the future and that all applications of conventional military force in the future should primarily be airpower. This line of reasoning is currently being used by advocates of an attack on Iran.

War as a Conflict of Minds

Of course, the Iranian military leadership has anticipated this and believe any future attack against them will be based on airpower/EBO focused on regime change and not a ground invasion. Airpower, to the Iranians, is a form of asymmetric attack since they can't compete in this arena. As a result, the Iranians have developed what they call a "Passive Defense" run by its paramilitary (the Basij), based on the lessons learned by Hezbollah during the 2006 war with Israel. Mansharof and Savyon have explored the tenets of Passive Defense with an excellent article now available on MEMRI. Their planning consists of:

·         Concealment of critical facilities and nodes. Likely also parallel communications infrastructure that allows central leadership to communication with local paramilitary forces. Paramilitary elements will be recruited and installed in all critical facilities/infrastructure to help with recovery. Widespread public participation.

·         Emergency services at the local level that will provide food, water, and other services when they are cut off during the EBO. The Basij is being trained to provide this.

·         Increased connectivity of infrastructure to neighboring countries to make it more politically sensitive for the US to attack (in short, this connectivity is why conventional warfare is becoming increasingly rare, and why there is so much resistance to an attack on Iran in most quarters).

Selected quotes from Gen. Jalali, head of Basij:

"With military bases and forces around [Iran], America has access to the entire territory of the country. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a political regime that relies upon the [Iranian] people... If the enemy aims to change the regime, it can achieve this by disrupting the [regime's ability] to administer the population. To this end, the enemy will attempt to paralyze infrastructures and the vital institutions of the regime, in order to sow dissatisfaction among the people."

"That is, the enemy will try to destroy the infrastructures [vital to] people's lives, and we must protect the people while providing necessary services. According to some analyses, the [2006] Lebanon war was 'a war of bridges,' because Israel destroyed all bridges in Lebanon, large and small, in order to cut off all land routes. In other words, in that war, the immediate aim was to [destroy] the infrastructures [that permit] administering the population, but the ultimate aim was to render such administration impossible."

Offensive Operations

In addition to Passive Defense, the Iranians are also likely planning asymmetric offensive operations aimed at shortening the engagement -- a form of strategic barrage designed to limit the duration of the EBO. For example, Hezbollah's rocket attacks on Israel during the 2006 war were able to inflict strategic economic/political costs on Israel. These costs ensured that the war was short. In Iran's case, this means a series of attacks (a combination of guerrilla, missile, and small boat attacks) on oil facilities and oil transportation routes with the intent of making the costs to the global economy so great that political pressure will quickly force an end to the engagement.

Posted by John Robb on Friday, 04 July 2008 at 08:52 AM | Permalink | Comments (16) | TrackBack (0)

Sobre a 'Guerra de 4ª geração', ver Aqui